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This paper analyzes the coercive and legitimate forms of power in Ukraine. It describes the
crisis of legitimacy in Ukraine as a contradiction between a blatantly cruel system of
capitalism dominated by a few oligarchs, and the lingering remnants of a Soviet mentality.
Two strategies are used by the Government to stoke the crisis. First, increased identiﬁ-
cation with ethnic or regional groups are instrumentally used by the Government to take
attention from economic and class issues. Second, the incorporation of a Soviet meaning of
power into the new national identity and presentation of it as core norms, believes, and
values of the people of Ukraine competes with alternative Ukrainian identity concepts. The
paper analyzes ﬁve main features of the Soviet meanings of power – political, social, and
economic paternalism, perception of power as source of proﬁt and violence, and the dual
reality of power with the gap between ofﬁcial narratives of power and a real life. The
process of incorporation of the Soviet concept of power into national identity is facilitated
by the process of national identity formation that helped to preserve the Soviet perception
of power, because of the absence of a new ideology, a lack of critical assessment of the
Soviet past, an absence of the vision of outcome, an embryonic culture of democracy, and
contributions of all the presidents to the preservation of the Soviet meaning of power.
People justify the system as legitimate and fair for many reasons: out of historic habit and
deemed moral obligations, self-interests and/or a fear of sanctions, identiﬁcation with the
ruler, zones of indifference, an absence of will and self-conﬁdence, desire to support
a strong leader based on ambiguity intolerance, hierarchy – enhancing ideologies, and
a general tolerance of injustice. The obedience of subjects is connected with the strength of
will of the subjects and the social structures of the society. In Ukraine, the society is not
united, not organized, has no identity of “us”, no civic accountability, nor even any real
interest in such matters. Civil society levels are very low, as reﬂected by limited oppor-
tunities for civic responsibility and participation and few demands from the society.
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sia-Paciﬁc Research Center, HaTwenty years after independence, Ukraine has yet to
build a democratic society and develop a distinct national
idea. Instead it rests on its Soviet past as reﬂected in the
continuing Soviet mentality and structures. At the same
time, power and wealth are concentrated in the hand of
a few oligarchs placing a majority of the people below the
poverty line and stripping them of rights and economic
opportunities. This paper suggests that Ukrainian society is
in crisis of legitimacy, resting on the contradiction betweennyang University. Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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preserved Soviet ideology. To increase its legitimacy, the
Government is using both the politics of ethnic divisions
and a validation of the regime based on a noxiousmix of
19th century capitalistic oppressive norms with Soviet-
style norms of paternalism, infancy, and craving for
a strong leader. Thus, the Ukrainian Government incorpo-
rates the Soviet-based meaning of power into the devel-
oping national identity, thereby reducing the ability of
people to oppose or resist the established regime.
Starting with a short overview of the theories of power
and legitimacy as well as a description of different types of
power, the paper then will brieﬂy discuss the use of coer-
cive power by the Ukrainian government. An in-depth
analysis is then offered, concentrating on the legitimacy
crisis in Ukraine. The author describes two strategies used
by the Government, moderating the crisis: (a) group
justiﬁcation and manipulation of ethnic divisions and (b)
providing legitimizing ideology and system justiﬁcation.
The former will be analyzed through a review of the
existing literature, while the latter will be discussed based
on results of interviews conducted by the author. In the
conclusion, a model of legitimation and moderation of
similar crises will be proposed and its comparative
dimensions will be discussed.
1. Theoretical foundations
The classic deﬁnition of power characterizes it as the
ability of one party to inﬂuence the behavior of the other
party and the ability of the other party to achieve its
objectives (Cartwright, 1959; Deutsch & Gerard, 1955;
Festinger, 1953, 1954; French & Raven,1959; Kelman, 1958).
Thus a group or individual in power can posit a threat to
other groups or individuals by creating the conditions in
which the superordinate group will feel inadequate to deal
with a current situation or satisfy their needs. The degree of
this threat depends upon the degree of power which can be
exercised within the system and can be increased in
stressful or ambiguous situation A person or group in
power can possess two groups of values: welfare values
(necessary conditions including well-being, wealth, skill)
and deference values whose necessary conditions
including taking into consideration power, respect, and
reputation. The rest of the people are dependent upon
‘inﬂuencing power’ for the satisfaction of their needs and
desires or the fulﬁllments of their goals. The increase of
inﬂuence of the leader depends on (1) acceptance of him by
a group, (2) an increase in certainty of his opinion, (3)
a decrease in certainty of other opinions, (4) increased
acceptance of his role, and (5) increased perception of
leader as an expert. Moscovici (1984, 1988) also describes
power as involving dependence and coercion against
people’s will, changing people’s will and beliefs through
norms and social consensus.
This perception of power sees it as “given”, self-
perpetuating, durable, hard to change or alter by people
who are dependent upon the good will, decisions, and
support of government in a hierarchical system (a top
down approach). It was challenged by Sharp (1973) who
introduced the perception of power as something fragile.Government is dependent on people’s good will, listen to
their decisions, and need their support (a bottom-up
approach). The sources of power includes not only
resources of a ruler, including authority (a right to
command or direct and be obeyed), skills and knowledge,
material resources and sanctions in disposal of a ruler, but
also human resources (people who obey a ruler) and
intangible factors (social and psychological factor including
habits and attitudes toward submission, presence of
ideology, common faith, etc). Sharp (1973) emphasizes that
these resources depend on obedience and cooperation of
the subjects and their contributions to the established
system. The view of a group as a precondition of inﬂuence
rather than simply an outcome was further developed by
Turner (2005).
Scholars differ in deﬁning the types of power. The classic
typology of French and Raven (1959) includes ﬁve types:
(1) reward power, based on perception that a leader has the
ability to mediate rewards; (2) coercive power, based on
perception that a leader can produce a punishment; (3)
legitimate power, based on perception of legitimate rights
of a leaders; (4) referent power, based on identiﬁcation
with a leader; and (5) expert power, based on acknowl-
edgment of speciﬁc knowledge or expertise of a leader.
Galam and Moscovici (1995) deﬁne three types of power:
institutional power as a power to dominate the group,
generative power as a group’s capacity for mobilizing skills
and multiplying resources, and ecological power that
mobilizes and directs activities toward the outside world.
Turner (2005) distinguishes a power ‘over’ and a power
‘through’ approach. A power over, a control as a capacity to
compel actions from people who are not convinced in the
validity of the speciﬁc belief or act, has two forms: legiti-
mate authority based on the acceptance of a right of the
ruler to prescribe speciﬁc beliefs, attitudes or actions; and
coercion as a power over others against their will. A power
through approach includes persuasion as power to
convince people in the rightness of a particular order and
shared belief in validity of a ruler. Thus, despite differences
in typologies, the scholars agree that a leader can have
power over others by virtue of resources under her or his
control or a power that results from mobilization and
inspiration to follow the path outlined by a leader. The
former can be deﬁned as a coercive power and the latter as
a legitimate power.
Legitimate power rests on internalized values and
acceptance that a leader has legitimate rights to inﬂuence
people who have an obligation to accept this inﬂuence.
Sharp (1973) distinguishes three bases of legitimate power:
cultural values that give leader a right to power (“eternal
yesterday” (Weber, 1918/1968) including age, caste, intel-
lect); acceptance of a social structure; and designation by
a legitimate agent. Theories of justice (Adams, 1963;
Homans, 1961; Lerner, 1980; Walster, Walster, & Berscheid,
1978) and theories of legitimacy of power (Blau, 1963;
Dornbusch, 1975; Easton, 1965; French & Raven, 1959; Linz,
Stepan, & Linz, 1978; Lipset, 1959; Weber, 1918/1968;
Zelditch, 2001; Zelditch & Walker, 1984) describe legiti-
macy as acceptance of the structure (system of power) as
“right” by both advantaged and disadvantaged groups. This
acceptance results in the stability of the system of power.
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supported by the members of privileged groups, members
of low status groups are in conﬂict with the discriminating
system and must deal with this incompatibility. There are
several explanations of the support of the system of power
by an underprivileged group.
The consensus theory states that legitimacy of social
order arrives from the consensus about the group goal(s)
and serves to stabilize the regime (Linz et al., 1978). Marx’s
“dominant ideology” hypothesis (Marx & Engels, 1845–
1847/1976) states that the ruling class controls the means
of mental production and to mask the conﬂict between
classes’ interests creates the predominant ideology
accepted by the ruled class as a “false consciousness.”
Weber (1918/1968) states that the legitimacy of norms,
values, beliefs, practices, and procedures on the collective
level (the concept of validity), is accepted by the people on
individual level and governs their behavior. The legiti-
mation process is a collective process of embedment of
social norms and beliefs into validity of the social order;
thus the stability of the regime depends on the collective
process of validation by others (Dornbusch, 1975). This
validation is critical for the increase of the strength of
legitimation on an individual level and provides justiﬁca-
tion of the system as a whole (Zelditch & Walker, 1984).
System justiﬁcation theory states that in their coping with
epistemic and existential sources of threat and anxiety,
“members in underprivileged group will engage in various
psychological processes- including social stereotyping and
various forms of motivated social perception and judg-
ment- aimed at defending the legitimacy of the social
systems” (Thorisdottir, Jost, & Kay, 2009, p. 9). Thus, the
legitimacy of the social order rests on the support of those
who have nothing to gain from it and could beneﬁt from
other structures (Jost & Major, 2001).
Social identity theory and social categorization theory
connect legitimacy to the development of a shared social
identity, stating that mutual inﬂuence creates a basis of
power as a capacity to persuade and/or control others to
carry out one’s will. Power rests on group identity reﬂect-
ing the collective goals, values and beliefs of group
members and social comparisons within and between
groups. People interpret and evaluate power use through
the lens of their salient group membership: ingroup
members are considered as more representative of group
goals and as more normative and persuasive (Wenzel &
Jobling, 2006). Thus, political leaders become inﬂuential
by employing the basic norms and ideas of social identity
and increasing perception of them as prototypical. To
increase his or her legitimacy, a political leader should not
only be a representative of ingroup identity but also to
champion the interests of this group, to form ingroup
identity, and to shape the reality in the image of ingroup
identity (Haslam, 2011). Legitimate authority is also “based
on ingroup norms that a person, role or group has the right
to prescribe appropriate beliefs, attitudes or behavior in
certain areas. The group agrees (by custom, experience, or
formal decision) that they ought to follow a speciﬁc person
or position (that it has the role of leadership or authority) to
express their collective will and short-circuit what might
be futile, divisive and time-consuming arguments aboutwhat is the right course of action” (Turner, 2005, p.11).
Legitimate authority empowers group members to achieve
their goals by creating a power structure through which
group identity and goals are realized.
Thus, legitimization of power is based on the employ-
ment, modiﬁcation, and creation of speciﬁc norms and
social identity that justify a particular order. To increase or
stabilize their power, political leaders must utilize the
prevailing meaning of social identity and shape it into
desired connotations, argues here that this process of
legitimization of power based on social identity requires
the incorporation of the speciﬁc meaning of power and
power relations between leaders and followers as a core of
a particular social identity. In other words, the speciﬁc
concept of power (speciﬁc connotations of chieftaincy,
authoritarianism, democracy, e.g.) and power relations
(speciﬁc types of paternalism, meritocracy, egalitarianism,
e.g.) is integrated into the very foundation of social identity
in the way that people perceive them as a core deﬁnition of
their “we-ness” and a characteristic that differentiate them
from others. Therefore, the resistance or opposition to
power becomes a ﬁght with one’s own identity and thus
almost unfeasible. Because of this cementation of the
meaning of power into the foundation of social identity, the
realization of power manipulations and development of
potential for resistance against existing regimes by indi-
viduals themselves (Foucault, 1990) or by enlightening by
intellectuals (Bourdieu, 1991) becomes extremely intricate.
Further discussionwill show how the crisis of legitimacy in
Ukraine is created by the incorporation of the Soviet
meaning of power and power relations into the developing
national identity through this embedded process of social
identity construction.
2. Methodology
2.1. Method
The main method of this research is a semi-structural
interview which consists of 6 questions regarding the
assessment of the current situation in Ukraine, its national
identity, the politics of language and history, history text-
books and the future development of Ukraine. Each inter-
view lasted between 1.5 and 3 h. In addition, the author
used participatory observation method during several
academic round-tables and political discussions, monitored
major TV programs that present political discussions
(Shuster Live, Freedom of Speech), and analyzed data
available at the libraries and on websites of academic
institutes and independent research centers.
2.2. Sample
The aim of this research was to interview people who
represent “1.5 diplomacy” level: scholars, political leaders,
and journalists that are active in the political sphere and
have impact on political discourse. I used purposive sample
of experts with elements of snowballing. For snowballing I
used 7 independent entry points. In addition, 3 widely
recognized experts were asked to assess the list of inter-
viewees to insure that the sample includes major experts
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The ﬁnal sample consists of 58 interviewees, 53 in Kiev and
5 in Simferopol, Crimea. Among them 7 are directors or
chairs of foreign foundations, 16 are directors or leading
scientists at academic institutes within the Ukrainian
Academy of Science (including the Institute of Philosophy,
Institute of History, Institute of Sociology, Institute of
Political and Ethnographic Research, Institute of World
Economy, etc), 10 are directors or leading experts at inde-
pendent think tanks and research centers, 7 are faculties of
the leading Ukrainian Universities, 9 are political leaders
(members of Government, Deputies of Verhovna Rada
(Parliament) and Directors of the Institute of National
Memory and the National Institute for Strategic Studies
under the President of Ukraine), and 4 are journalists. This
paper represents analysis of interviews of 48 Ukrainian
respondents (the answers of 10 foreign experts from
Europe and the U.S. are excluded based on the aim of this
paper). Gender representation is inﬂuenced by the partic-
ular nature of academic and political spheres in Ukraine:
among respondents 40 are male and 8 are female.
2.3. Methods of data analysis
All answers of respondents were organized by 14 cate-
gories: (1) the nature of the Ukrainian state; (2) ethnic
divisions (3) problems of development; (4) achievements;
(5) a source of the national pride; (6) dynamics of identity
during last two presidents: Vladimir Yushchenko and
Victor Yanukovich; (7) the concept of national identity; (8)
common unifying factors; (9) the roots of group divides;
(10) the role of language; (11) the politics of history; (12)
reactions to the change of textbooks by Dmitriy Tabachnic,
the Minister of Education in Yanukovich’s Government;
(13) youth and (14) the future of Ukraine. The deﬁnition of
each category will be discussed later in this paper. The
58  14 table was created to present answers of all
respondents that correspond with the categories of the
analysis. The respondents’ narratives varied by the level of
the development of each category; some categories were
not always addressed by each respondents.
3. Crisis of legitimacy in Ukraine
The ambiguous, unstable, and vague nature of Ukrainian
power has been stressed by both Ukrainian and interna-
tional experts. “Part of the puzzle of Ukrainian politics, for
practitioners as well as political scientists, is to ﬁgure out
what constitutes power and how it can be wielded effec-
tively” (D’Anieri, 2011, p. 29). The use of coercive power by
Yanukovich’s Government has been discussed at length in
academic papers and international organizations reports
(D’Anieri, 2011; FreedomHouse, 2011; Heritage Foundation
&Wall Street Journal, 2011; Kuzio, 2010, 2011; Malan, 2011;
Nan, 2011; Pew Forum, 2009; Transparency International,
2010; Umland, 2011). These various authors show the use
of coercive power in politics, economy, control of mass
media and civic society. D’Anieri, 2011 analyzes the
incentives system known as “administrative resources”
where patronage is an exchange of government support
and jobs for political support, and where selective lawenforcement is used as a powerful tool to control the
economy, the press, and individual politicians. “Positive
inducements include, above all, jobs, immunity from
prosecution, and business opportunities. Negative induce-
ments include losing one’s job or one’s ﬁrm. These
inducements, in the absence of ideology, can be highly
effective. The problem for the ruling group is the bill must
keep being paid” (p. 34).
This paper concentrates on the question of legitimacy
of power in Ukraine. Habermas (1975) saw the crisis of
legitimacy in the contradiction between monopoly capi-
talism and liberal ideology: justiﬁcations of a controlled
market by free market ideology. This crisis “cannot be
separated from the viewpoint of the one who is under-
going it” and results from “an objective force that deprives
a subject of some parts of his normal sovereignty” and
feelings of freedom (Habermas, 1975, p. 1). Because of the
absence of a developed free market and democratic
ideology in Ukraine, the crisis of legitimacy in Ukrainian
society is embedded in the contradiction between the
capitalist-based monopoly of a few oligarchs and the
preserved Soviet mentality. Ukrainian oligarchs accumu-
late their capital through the use of internal resources
treating Ukraine as their exploitable colony. During the
1990s “‘institutionalized oligarchic capital and clannish
power’ took hold and society became divided into the
super wealthy and the poor” (Kuzio, 2011, p. 95). This
concentration of capital was supported through structural
changes in political, legislative, and ﬁnancial systems.
Respondents in my study believed that the oligarchs do
not care about Ukraine, do not invest in its future or
development, and are interested only in temporary capital
gains. The gap between the wealthy and the poor is
growing, people are treated as slaves, and systems of
social support and security have been abandoned. They
perceive Ukraine building a model of 19th century wild
capitalism guided by the images in Marx’s books with
omnipotent oligarchs, absent middle classes, and power-
less workers (Korostelina, 2011). At the same time, after
20 years of independence, Ukraine failed to build
a democratic society and develop a national idea, main-
taining its Soviet mentality and structure. The Soviet
reality still dominates society and is evident in the high
levels of corruption, paternalism, administrative mis-
management, and an aversion toward innovation. There
is an ongoing struggle between Soviet and post-Soviet
identities in which Soviet characteristics still prevail in
the consciousness of people (Levada, 2000; Ryvkina,
2005; Zadorin & Petuhov, 2011).
To deal with this crisis of legitimacy, the people and the
Governments employ dual strategies. The ﬁrst strategy is
connected with group justiﬁcation by people (developing
a membership in a group that provide them security and
self-esteem) and the manipulation of the resultant divide
in the society by political leaders. The second strategy
implies a justiﬁcation of the system by the people (through
perceptions that the system is fair, legitimate, and just) and
the employment of a legitimizing ideology by the political
leaders. The former strategy is intensely analyzed in
academic literature on Ukraine, and will only be discussed
brieﬂy in this section; the latter strategy has received less
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greater depth in the following section.
The ﬁrst strategy of dealing with legitimacy crisis in
Ukraine involves active employment of ethnic and regional
identity as well as blatant nationalism. As Tajfel and Turner
(1986) show, the rise of ethnocentrism results from the
absence of a legitimized and justiﬁed power system. Many
scholars stress the importance of ethnic or regional identity
in Ukraine, its impact on voting behavior and foreign policy,
and use of this divide by Ukrainian politicians (Arel, 1995,
2006; Åslund, 2009; D’Anieri, 2011; Hansen & Hesli, 2009;
Hnatuk, 2004; Korostelina, 2008, 2010, 2011, inpress; Kulyk,
2009; Kuzio, 2007, 2010; Motyl, 1993; Pifer, 2009, p. 60;
Ryabchuk, 2003; Shulga, 2011; Shulman, 2005; Wilson,
2002, 2009). Previous research by the author revealed the
existence of six different narratives about the Ukrainian
national concept and national identity, ﬁve of which rest on
powerful salient ethnic identities and strongly opposed
other narratives (Korostelina, in press). Prevalence of
ethnic-based ideologies leads to the perception of society as
a zero-sum game where one concept of the society should
prevail over other’s narratives. It produces aggressiveness,
an ‘enemyhunt’mentality, antagonism, andhostility among
people. As themajority of respondents in the authors’ study
stated, the Government supports these differences and uses
ethnic identity to cover class divides, redirecting attention
from pressing economic issues.
The authorities employ both legitimation and delegiti-
mation processes, operating them in tandem, creating
a decreasing moral acceptance of one ethnic and regional
group and associating it with policies and increasing moral
acceptance of another one (Kelman, 2001). The intensity of
this shift in norms depends on a congruence of this re-
categorization with a particular group’s interests and
preferences, and rests on historic and structural disposi-
tions of the society. Thus, the legitimacy of the Ukrainian
Government depends on the extent to which the pop-
ulation perceives it as reﬂecting their ethno-cultural iden-
tity or regional identity, and meeting their group’s political,
social and economic interests. The latent Soviet mentality
of the people that is based on black-and-white thinking and
a search for an enemy is easily manipulated by those who
employ differences for their political purposes.
4. Legitimizing ideology
As mentioned above, the experts on Ukraine shed less
light on a contentious use of legitimizing ideology by the
Ukrainian power and justiﬁcation of this social system by
citizens. Thus it is the main focus of this paper. The current
Ukrainian Government realizes the impossibility of
blatantly reinstating the old Soviet identity; it would be in
contradictionwith the capitalist nature of economy and the
self-deﬁnition of Ukraine as an open society. Thus, it has
had to construct a new national identity that includes
features of a capitalist economy but centers on the Soviet
meaning of power and power relations: submission to the
state, hierarchical administrative management, and pater-
nalistic expectations of welfare. Such a mix of two opposite
ideologies seems to be impossible at ﬁrst glance: Soviet
ideology was based on the ideas of equality andexpropriation of capital on the one hand, while on the other
there is a focus on increasing concentration of capital in
hands of oligarchs, whose ﬁnancial interests are realized
through the political, legislative, and ﬁnancial systems.
Nevertheless the author posits here that the very meaning
of the Soviet concept of power is compatible with the
reality of an unjust form of capitalism which is being built
by the Ukrainian Government. This compatibility offers the
ruling elite a great opportunity to create a consistent
ideology that supports their interests. This ideology does
not exist solely as a reasoned or explicit construct; rather it
includes unconscious elements deriving from the socio-
cultural experiences of its leaders (Cunningham, Nezlek,
& Banaji, 2004; Norsek, Banaji, & Jost, 2009). While
according to many experts, Yanukovich’s Government does
not have a deﬁned national ideology and Yanukovich
himself avoided any discussions of a national idea, some
policies reveal the nature of the developing concept of
a national identity. This concept of national identity
includes both deliberately manipulated components and
unconscious elements that derive from the Soviet experi-
ence of Ukrainian leaders. This argument is explained here
through analysis of both the speciﬁc employment of the
Soviet meanings of power and the processes of the Ukrai-
nian national identity formation.
4.1. Soviet meaning of power
The analysis of the Soviet meaning of power deserves
a profound analysis, but due to space limitation this paper
concentrates on several features of the meaning of power
that were derived from analysis of the interviews.
The ﬁrst feature is political and social paternalism.
Soviet form of relationship to property ownership still
shapes the consciousness of people today. This perception
of power still exists and results in the continued depen-
dence of the people upon the state, and the prevalence of
the State over society. So deep is this reliance on govern-
ment, that, even after 20 years of independence, distant
government ofﬁcials continue to make all decisions with
little societal input or public discussion. People still
struggle to understand that Ukraine is not a fragment of the
Soviet Union, and labor to overcome the Soviet socio-
structural mentality. Many still expect the State to
provide for the people, giving them a stable job that can last
all life. Dissatisfaction with the government is represented
by the idea “Government is not thinking about me, I am not
wanted by the Country.” The majority of Ukrainians expect
that a just state should secure welfare and social protection
of citizens, while the function of the state to secure political
rights of citizens is considered less important (Kiryukhin &
Shcherbak, 2007). The majority of the population is served
by political populists, such as Yulia Timoshenko and Victor
Yanukovich, who promise a system of welfare but not the
conditions for personal or political development. Thus, the
paternalistic mentality and reliance on welfare are actively
employed and maintained by populist politicians and the
Yanukovich’s Government (Kuzio, 2011). Perhaps
a contributing factor the people of Ukraine are described as
tolerant, patient, accepting different powers through
history without open resistance.
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represented by an economic executive-leader and a class of
workers. People see the labor collective as a referent group,
a group of support and a guaranty of stability where people
haveworked for decades under the leadership of a director-
“father”. They seemingly connected their life with the
USSR’s infrastructures and still identify themselves with
the Soviet Union. Uncertainty and increasing mobility leads
to insecurity, depression, a loss of one’s bearings, and
a lower level of adaptation. Many people have nostalgia for
the Soviet times, seeking to continue the previously effec-
tive (or at least idolized) practices of societal creation,
sustained by the Soviet type of enthusiasm of the people,
and receiving support from the state. The concept “red
directors”, which was actively employed by Kuchma,
reﬂects this Soviet style of management, and is now
actively utilized by other unitized economic oligarchs. The
history of the Stahanov’s movement (the movement to
fulﬁll several daily quotas instead of one based solely on
Soviet enthusiasm) is recreating descriptions of the Ukrai-
nian history of the twentieth century to glorify people’s
sacriﬁces for the economic development of their country
and justify slow economic reforms.
Third is the view of state property as a source of proﬁts
and easy money. In the beginning of 1990s, few knew what
to do with the country and the economy. Ukraine, rich with
geographic potential, an established industrial base,
extensive natural resources, and a stable productive
economy was viewed as a trophy territory by the Govern-
ment and people. This “trophy” perception (“steal and
squander”) prevailed, affecting people’s value system.
During his presidency Kuchma complained, “Everyone here
views himself as a transitional ﬁgure. They want to grab
something and run off with it. I’m taking about people at
the very top” (Kuzio, 2011, p. 96). Now, according to the
respondents, the general philosophy among people is
“family ﬁrst, me the second, the hell with the rest”. There is
no respect for others, but rather a “me ﬁrst scenario”
prevails. People are only inspired to increase their personal
wealth and see power as a tool for personal gains. People
accept the idea that common property does not belong to
anyone and can be stolen, destroyed, or neglected
(Ermolenko, 2010). Further, that people come to power not
to serve the society but to abuse power for personal gains.
The acceptance of widespread corruption by the Govern-
ment legitimizes this meaning of power (Kuzio, 2011). The
promise of the President to combat corruption as a major
problem in Ukraine also has failed: “Glaring conﬂicts of
interest among senior ofﬁcials in the new government,
combined with further delays in the passage of anticor-
ruption legislation, fueled public skepticism about the
leadership’s pledges to combat graft in 2010” (Freedom
House, 2011, p. 585). According to Transparency Interna-
tional’s Corruption Perceptions Index, in 2010 Ukraine was
ranked 134 out of 178 surveyed countries (Transparency
International, 2010). The Heritage Foundation’s 2010
Index of Economic Freedom puts Ukraine at 162nd out of
179 surveyed states (Heritage Foundation & Wall Street
Journal, 2011). Corruption was reported as a major
national problem by 70% of respondents, followed by
pollution (64%) and crime (56%) (Pew Forum, 2009).Forth is the perception of power as violence. The socio-
cultural link between concepts of “power” and “violence”
results in the perception, and most importantly, in accep-
tance of power as inevitably brutal. This link is based both
on semantic connections and Soviet interpretation of
power (Kebuladze, 2010). The communist ideology equates
power and violence, presenting hostility and cruelty as
legitimate uses of power against the population. In his work
“State and Revolution” Lenin (1917/1974) describes the
state as an evil instrument of exploitation of the working
class. However, Lenin says that the “dictatorship of the
proletariat” is an inevitable iniquity in the process of the
creation of communism. This concept creates a meaning of
power as inevitable violence of the state toward the people.
Thus, people do not perceive justice as a societal concept.
Instead, the majority of Ukrainian respondents describe the
category of justice as a personal quality or a characteristic of
an individual act or as a characteristic of interpersonal
relationships, including mutuality, trust, mutual respect
and consent (Kiryukhin & Shcherbak, 2007). Therefore, the
Government considers coercive power an effective tool and,
as was discussed above, increasingly uses coercive power
with the prevalence of threat of punishment as an
incentive.
Fifth is the dual reality of power. The Soviet meaning of
power rests on a surreal world of two realities: an ofﬁcial
façade of Soviet structures and a real everyday life of people
limited in opportunities and activities. Current Ukrainian
society also can be described as a façade democracy with
a corresponding virtual reality: there are state, courts, and
a Parliament, but in reality, they are just imitations of
democratic processes. The decisions are made informally,
with policies changing from president to president. People
accept this virtual reality as true, believing that just one
more step would change life for the better. This virtual
world created for the Ukrainian people does not intersect
with the real world of corruption as a way of life. This dual
system provides Government an opportunity to manage
the country and accumulate capital. Hence they strive to
preserve the social engineering that facilitates this system.
The speeches of politicians and ofﬁcial reports show high
economic growth (104% growth of gross revenue, 119%
growth in the populations’ income, and 120% in salaries
(Modernization of Ukraine, 2011)); while in July 2011, For-
bes placed Ukraine in fourth place among theworld’s worst
economies (Forbes, 2011). Further the Ukrainian population
themselves, scores the economy a 2.5 on a scale from 0 to
10, with 10 representing the highest level (Vorona &
Shulga, 2010).
Thus, the Sovietmeaning of power includes political and
social paternalism as relations between people and
Government, economic paternalism as dependency of
people on economic managers, views power as a source of
personal gains rather than a service to the society,
perception of power as inevitably violent and cruel, and the
dual reality of power as a virtual gap between power and
real life. All these ﬁve components of the Soviet meaning of
power now are actively utilized by the Ukrainian Govern-
ment in the development of national identity. Ukraine is
depicted as a country of tolerant, patient people who avoid
conﬂicts and aim at increase of their wellbeing above all,
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government, but acquiesce to its power. National identity is
built on the history of great victory in the Great Patriotic
War (1941–45), achievements of Soviet Ukraine (airplanes,
rockets, science), and that it “was in the list of ten most
developed countries and was invited to be one of the
establishing states of the UN for its contribution to the
defeat of Fascism” (citation from the interview). In May
2011 Yanukovich signed the law that permitted the use of
Soviet red ﬂag during the celebration of the victory in the
Great Patriotic War (this law was revoked as unconstitu-
tional by the Supreme Court later in June).
4.2. Formation of Ukrainian national identity
The analysis of interviews shows some speciﬁc features
of national identity formation that facilitated the preser-
vation and re-installation of the Soviet meaning of power
into the core foundation of a new national identity. The
following aspects were mentioned or discussed in details
by the majority of respondents.
The ﬁrst aspect of identity dynamics is the absence of
a new ideology. By the time of Ukrainian independence in
1991 there was no vision of a Ukrainian nation-state or
national ideology. The centuries-long ﬁght for Ukrainian
independence did not result in a shared comprehensive
concept of Ukraine. Ukraine achieved its independence by
default, through the dissolution of the Soviet Union. As
Motyl (1993) notes “that Ukrainian independence came so
abruptly and so unexpectedly has enormous consequences
for the future of the country” (p. 50). Communists who
were in power at this moment either did not understand
the need for a new concept or were afraid of enacting
radical changes in order to preserve their power; thus they
did not make any consistent efforts to deﬁne Ukrainian
national identity. It was not discussed in Universities or
among intellectual elites during the 1990s. They continued
to use Marxist-Leninist foundations for understanding of
society and Soviet concepts such as national ‘nost’, native
people, and national minorities. Instead of changing
inherited Soviet structures, the state just renamed some of
them. Thus, the concept of national identity continued to
center around Soviet ideology.
Second is the lack of critical assessment of the Soviet
past. The development of a new national identity should
rest on critical rethinking and assessment of Ukrainian
history, but the Soviet heritage has become a major source
of conﬂict. On one side, it was deemed that the revival of
Ukrainian identity is unachievable without utilizing the
experience of the Soviet Union; people cannot distance
themselves from the past. The other side argued that the
only possibility for Ukraine to prosper is to completely
wipe out the Soviet era from the new national narrative.
Thus, the Soviet heritage and especially Soviet meaning of
power and power relations between a state and people was
never comprehended nor critically assessed.
Third is the absence of the vision of outcome. The
preservation of the Soviet ideology arrives from the
absence of a common vision about the direction or ﬁnal
outcome of the transitional process from communism.
Faced with limited and untested models for overcomingcommunism embedded in societies, the Government never
created an image of a new Ukraine as a self-efﬁcient and
integrated nation-state. The abstract idea that Ukraine
should eventually join the European Union does not have
any real foundations because Ukraine is completely
excluded from European experiences. Only four percent of
people travel abroad, and the several million Ukrainians
whowork in Europe do not plan to return. Thus, theWest is
erroneously perceived as only a capitalist society rather
than an informational civic society.
Fourth is the embryonic culture of democracy. Interna-
tional experts and national elites had hoped that the
transformation of the economy to a free market type of
economy would lead to a change in people’s mentality (“as
Karl Marx had taught”), but now there is an understanding
that they need to change people’s perceptions ﬁrst. It was
also believed that amarket economywould result inwealth
and democracy for all, but this is not, as it turns out, theway
that a democracy evolves. Thus, the culture of democracy in
Ukraine is embryonic with democracy as a subject taught
only for 12 h at a University level within a general philos-
ophy course, and for 3 h at the school level. “Mass
consciousness, declaratively supporting the market
economy, political democracy and legal state, maintains the
paternalism stereotypes in full amount, dependence of the
state psychology and helplessness before its self-will”
(Golovakha & Panina, 2006, p. 37).
And last but not least, all the Ukrainians presidents
contributed to the preservation of the Soviet mentality.
While the majority of the interviewees in the authors’
research limited the discussion about President Leonid
Kravchuk to the acknowledgment of his incompetence, the
presidency of Leonid Kuchma was described as a cementa-
tion of the Soviet concept of power. The majority of
respondents stated that Kuchma employed the Soviet
concept of “red directors”-paternalistic relations between
industrial leaders and a working class to legitimize the
existing regime. He also utilized the Soviet perception of
the Ukrainian SSR as a cradle for friendship of different
ethnic groups thus simultaneously supporting opposite
sentiments and beliefs of different ethnic groups. Accord-
ing to D’Anieri (2011) “Leonid Kuchmawas able to evade or
ignore the rules that constrained him and at the same time
to rewrite the rules in ways that increased his power”
(p. 40).
The assessment of President Victor Yushchenko signif-
icantly differed depending on the respondents’ prevailing
narrative about national identity: pro-Ukrainian, dual
identity, multicultural concept, etc. Nevertheless, all
respondents acknowledged that he did not succeed in the
destruction of the Soviet mentality. The respondents sup-
porting dual identity narratives stressed that Yushchenko
tried to destroy old symbols and beliefs, imposed a Ukrai-
nian ethnic identity on all Ukraine, and took actions that
led to Ukraine’s degradation. Yushchenko completely failed
to implement a systemic ethno-cultural approach and tried
to build an ethnic concept of national identity by sup-
porting nationalism and dominance of one group over
others. Respondents stated that his approach to the use of
history (Golodomor, victimization, OUN) did not receive
support of the majority of population but rather led to an
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destroy a Soviet mentality were loaded with ethnic exclu-
sivity and thus were resisted by Ukraine’s population.
On the other hand, the interviews supporting pro-
Ukrainian narratives (Korostelina, 2011b) propose alterna-
tive explanations of Yushchenko’s failure to wipe out the
Soviet mentality. According to them, Yushchenko under-
stands the European roots of Western Ukraine and tried to
develop these values for all Ukraine. Thus, he aimed to
destroy the old Soviet myths and create new dynamics, by
introducing a policy that broke the ambivalent policy of
Kuchma, introduced Golodomor as a Holocaust and a key
event that changed the nation, opened the truth about the
1920–30s and WWII. But the realization of his project to
alter the Soviet mentality was impeded by the opposition
of the Eastern regions and the Russian speaking population.
In addition, Yushchenko did not develop a balanced
approach, explain his policy adequately, nor promoted it
enough in mass media and education.
A different explanation was proposed by the respon-
dents who were supporting a multicultural narrative. They
noted that Yushchenko provoked a lot of problems by his
chaotic actions and nativism, worked against unity of
Ukraine’s people, and discredited the idea of Ukrainian
culture. There was no evolution, or gradual process of
altering values from the Soviet era. He developed the
concept of Golodomor without any methodology of
collection and analysis of historic data. His fervent actions
to promote OUN/UPA and Bandera undermined the good
idea of creating of Ukrainian history separate from Soviet
history.
In the author’s interviews, the majority of respondents,
independent of their political afﬁliation and preferences,
said that the Orange Revolution was a symbolic event in
Ukrainian history. It illustrated the ability of people to
express and defend their political will and to impact the
history of their country. The emotional connection and
mutual support among protestor were very high, and the
feeling of a common civic identity was extremely salient.
But, unfortunately, the political and social turmoil caused
by the conﬂicts among Orange Revolution leaders,
a constant reshufﬂing of the government, and rapid
economic decline led to a decreasing support of the Orange
Revolution among citizens. Assessing the lessons of the
Orange Revolution, only one third of the respondents
believed that the mass protest was useful. These respon-
dents were divided between those who judged it as
successful (14.8%) and those who considered it unsuc-
cessful (18.6%). More than one third of the respondents
(35.2%) stated that the goals of the Orange Revolution were
just, but the leaders had let people down. Another 28.9%
agreed that the Orange Revolution increased the differ-
ences between the regions. In addition, only 14.2%
considered the revolution as a positive event, while 34.9%
considered it as having a negative impact on Ukraine
(Vorona & Shulga, 2010).
The experts also differ in their assessment of the
Yanukovich presidency. The experts supporting dual iden-
tity narrative believe that people supported Yanukovich in
opposition to the blatant Ukrainian nationalism of Yush-
chenko, but currently the Government is not involved innation building: as Yanukovich played up to every group in
the society, his party became amorphous. The supporters of
the pro-Ukrainian narratives state that the Government
creates conﬂicts around history and language, introducing
the red ﬂag law that prescribe the use of the replica of the
Soviet ﬂag during holidays in Ukraine as a provocation and
a challenge for Ukrainian independence. Yanukovich
brought a Russian model alien to the people of Ukraine and
did not know how to transform it into a national concept.
Thus, while representatives of a dual narrative think that
Yanukovich does not do enough to support Russian people
in Ukraine, representatives of pro-Ukrainian narratives
think that he is actively conveying a Russian ideology. The
author believes that in reality, Victor Yanukovich acts
similar to Leonid Kuchma, promoting and reintroducing
the Soviet meaning of power into the national identity of
Ukraine. He is not submitting to Russia as many experts
have thought: in his foreign policy Yanukovich is devel-
oping a multilateral strategy, cooperating with NATO and
the West, with Russia and with China. In domestic spheres,
he policies play both sides of the ethnic/regional divide and
promote “Shevchenko’s Ukraine” of the Soviet era.
Thus, during twenty year of independence, Ukraine did
not change the concept of nation and power. Nor was the
Soviet heritage and especially the Soviet meanings of
power were never examined and critically assessed. The
alternative to the Soviet regime – the West – was errone-
ously perceived as a capitalist society rather than an
informational civic society, and the culture of democracy
and civic society was never developed. While Kuchma was
actively employing Soviet identity to legitimize his power,
Yushchenko’s intentions to destroy the Soviet legacy and
mentality were not realized. As Kuzio puts it, “Yushchenko
was never a revolutionary. He had moderate nationalist
views, and did not support radical transformations (Kuzio,
2011, p. 91). Because of the failure of Yushchenko’s policies,
the regime based on the Soviet meaning of power created
during Kuchma’s presidency has reemerged in the rule of
the Party of Regions and President Yanukovych.
5. Justiﬁcation of system
People located within the social system of norms and
symbols of power accept this power as legitimate, even if
they have a disadvantaged position within this system
(Bourdieu). They continue to support the social order even
if the power is fruitless; thus there is a lag in time before
destabilization emerges (Linz et al., 1978). People obey
ruling regimes based on several factors (Sharp, 1973). The
ﬁrst factor is a habit based on a long history of power
relations and moral obligation to obey, which in turn, is
based on internalization of customs and beliefs of the
society. As discussed above, the long history of Soviet
power relations were not critically assessed. Rather they
were reintroduced into the new concept of national iden-
tity, supporting a seeming moral obligation to obey the
Government. The second factor is the self-interest of the
subjects (prestige, power, economic gains) and a fear of
sanctions. The extensive use of coercive power by the
Government results in a fear of sanctions and realizations
of people’s self interests through cooperation with
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a psychological identiﬁcation with the ruler (especially in
societies with broken social orders or ambiguity). The
employment of Soviet symbols and traditions by Yanuko-
vich and his Government increases the social identiﬁcation
with them among populations bogged down in Soviet
sentiments. The fourth factor is zones of indifference.
People of the Ukraine “do not see themselves giving up
much” (D’Anieri, 2011, p. 29) in their support of the
Government, thus creating the zone of indifference
regarding the regime of the day. The ﬁfth factor is an
absence of self-conﬁdence or will among subjects. People
do not have self-conﬁdence, civic agency and willingness to
protest the regime. The willingness to participate in lawful
meetings and demonstration declined from 34.2% in 2005
to 24.7% in 2008. Instead, the belief that all forms of protest
are ineffective grew from 25.2% in 2005 to 34.1% in 2008.
55.8% of the respondents do not believe in the possibility of
a new revolution in Ukraine (Vorona & Shulga, 2010).
Sixth, without clear ideas about the directions of
development that rest on an ideological fatigue of
communism, and negative views on democracy, results in
people being marginalized. They feel more anxiety in life,
uncertainty, and pessimism regarding non-fulﬁlled hopes.
This ‘ambiguity intolerance’ (Kirton, 2003; Wilkinson,
2006) increases the paternalistic attitudes and support for
a strong political leader. The psychological need to manage
uncertainty and threat, consistently enhances politically
conservative opinions (Jost, Kay, & Thorisdottir, 2009).
Thus, according to the Institute of Sociology, 74% of
respondents stated that there is high level of disorder and
uncertainty in the society; 73.4% declared that they could
not comprehend changes in the society, and 80% agreed
that the majority of people do not believe in anything
(Vorona & Shulga, 2010). According to Pew Forum research,
the approval of change toward democracy in Ukraine
dropped from 72% in 1991 to 30% in 2009, with the decline
of 42% being biggest among all post-Soviet countries.
Approval of change to capitalism also declined from 52% to
36% positioning Ukraine in the fourth place from the end
after Hungary, Lithuania, and Bulgaria. Moreover, 69%
prefer a strong leader over democratic government (20%),
also the biggest gap in Europe. Moreover, the preference for
democratic leaders declined from 57% in 1991 to 20% in
2009. A full 55% of Ukrainians disapprove of democracy
(the biggest disapproval rate in Europe) and the support for
a multiparty system declined from 72% in 1991 to 30% in
2009. There is a “strong normative consensus in favor of
a stronger presidency in Ukraine. This is one thing that
Tymoshenko, Yushchenko, and Yanukovich all agreed
upon, and few, if any, Ukrainians disagree” (D’Anieri, 2011,
p. 41).
Seventh, the inequalities in society should be supported
by legitimatizing hierarchy – enhancing ideologies
(Sidanius, Levin, Federico, & Pratto, 2001) accepted by both
privileged and underprivileged groups. While it is widely
accepted that dominant groups more than disadvantaged
groups support such ideologies, the most important is
consensual ideology that represents ideas and beliefs
which both groups agree about. By accepting these myths,
members of underprivileged groups support their ownoppression. In case of Ukraine, both groups accept the ideas
that socialist ideas of equality and justice are a rigid taboo in
the current society; that all imitations of democratic
processes are as amatter of fact real; that personal property
and wellbeing is the most important value, etc. Thus,
Ukrainian respondents stated that economic prosperity
wasmore important for them than democracy (74% vs.50%).
According to the Pew report “78% of Ukrainian respondents,
more than seven-in-ten say that if they had to choose, they
would prefer a strong economy than democracy (12%), the
biggest gap in Europe” (Pew Forum, 2009). The report also
shows that the percent of people that believe that “the rich
get richer and the poor get poorer” declined from 65% in
1991 to 48% in 2009 that again supports the justiﬁcation of
the system by disadvantaged group.
Eighth, members of disadvantaged groups are not
motivated to be involved in collective actions of protest or
social change movement if they have a chance of upward
mobility, thus embodying ‘the tolerance of injustice’
(Wright, 2009). According to Taylor and McKirnan’s (1984)
theory of ﬁve stages of social transformation for any
established, stratiﬁed society with low status groups ,
social, political, or economic processes, such as growth of
capitalism and modernization can lead to the development
of individualistic ideologies. At this stage, disadvantaged
groups consider the social structure illegitimate. Highly
qualiﬁed, better-educated members of this groups attempt
to join the advantaged group and try to become assimilated
either completely or partially. The privileged group usually
accepts these highly qualiﬁed people, both because their
desire to assimilate is seen as proof of the privileged
group’s superiority and because the encouragement of this
assimilation process brings some stability to society. Other
members of underprivileged group also see the possibilities
for assimilation and search for successful ways to move up.
Examples of such mechanisms in Ukraine are a political
career or a position as the People’s deputy in local or
national Verhovna Rada. D’Anieri (2011) has estimated that
2.5 million jobs, or roughly 10 percent of the Ukrainian
adult population, depend on the government.
And last, but not least, people have both cognitive and
emotional incentives to preserve the status quo. Existing
systems are more available, accessible in memory, and
more often are considered by people then new ones. People
could be even unaware that alternatives exist or optional
(Higgins, 1996; Sloman, 1996). They also feel more
emotionally connected with the old systems than the new
ones. Moreover, earlier experiences are remembered better
than later experiences, are perceived as more stable and
less mutable, and create a foundation for a personal
worldview. Existing conditions also serves as a reference
point for comparison based on its familiarity and primacy
for people (Eidelman & Crandall, 2009). Thus, the Soviet
meaning of power is perceived as normal, suitable, and
tolerable while democratic principles are not clear and
easily acceptable and are perceived as alien to the society.
6. Conclusion
This paper argues that the crisis of legitimacy in Ukraine
is not between a Soviet mentality and democratic values as
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is posed as being between a blatant cruel system of capi-
talism of a few oligarchs and a preserved Soviet mentality.
A regime is legitimate if a leader represents and further
develops a social identity dominant in the society (Haslam,
2011). While a Soviet identity in its blatant form could not
be accepted in the Ukrainian society any longer, the use of
ethnic differences in the society and the incorporation of
the Soviet meanings of power into a new national identity
helps the Government to moderate the existing crisis of
legitimacy. These two strategies and themajor mechanisms
of this process are presented in Fig. 1.
One strategy is to use people’s tendency to cope with
crisis through increased identiﬁcation with ethnic or
regional groups. Despite different interpretations of the
ethnic and regional divides, the respondents in the inter-
views agreed that the Government is instrumental in using
it as a tool of taking attention from economic and class
issues and thus from the legitimacy crisis in society. The
second strategy is the incorporation of the Soviet meaning
of power into a new national identity. The Ukrainian
President and his Government support and promote Soviet
norms of power among the population and present them as
core norms, believes, and values of the people of Ukraine.
The main features of the Soviet meaning of power that
are incorporated into Ukrainian national identity are
political, social, and economic paternalism, perception of
power as source of proﬁt and violence, and the dual reality
of power with the gap between ofﬁcial narratives of power
and a real life. Thus, Ukrainians are described as a tolerant,Crisis of legitimacy between Soviet mentality a
Moderated by the concept of national ide
Group justification and 
manipulation of divide
Legitimizin
incorporation of
into n
Soviet meaning of 
power:
1) political  and 
social paternalism
2) economic
paternalism
3) power as profit
4) power as violence
5) dual reality of 
power
Dynamics of national 
identity:
1) absence of new ideolo
2) luck of critical assessm
of the Soviet past
3) absence of the vision
outcome
4) embryonic culture of 
democracy
5) contribution of all
presidents to the preserv
of the Soviet meaning of
power
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above all, historically live their own life, and do not trust
a government, but subsumes to its power. The process of
incorporation of the Soviet concept of power into national
identity is facilitated by the process of national identity
formation that helped to preserve the Soviet perception of
power, because of the absence of a new ideology, a lack of
critical assessment of the Soviet past, an absence of the
vision of outcome, an embryonic culture of democracy, and
contributions of all the presidents to the preservation of the
Soviet meaning of power. People justify the system as
legitimate and fair for many reasons: out of historic habit
and deemed moral obligations, self-interests and/or a fear
of sanctions, identiﬁcation with the ruler, zones of indif-
ference, an absence of will and self-conﬁdence, desire to
support a strong leader based on ambiguity intolerance,
hierarchy – enhancing ideologies, and a general tolerance
of injustice.
The obedience of subjects is not constant and is a result
of an act of volition; thus all government is based upon
consent. The degree of control of the government depends
on (1) the relative desire of people to control it, (2) the
relative strength of independent organizations and insti-
tutions, and (3) people’s relative ability to withhold their
consent and assistance (Sharp, 1973). Thus, freedom is not
given by a ruler but rather it is established by the strength
of will of the subjects and the social structures of the
society. In Ukraine, the society is not united, not organized,
has no identity of “us”, no civic accountability, nor even any
real interest in such matters. Civil society levels are verynd cruel capitalism
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organizations, limited opportunities for civic responsibility
and participation, and few demands from the society. Even
the Orange Revolution failed to build a civil society with
civic responsibilities and citizen agency, resulting in
replacing a “bad tsar with another tsar.” Further efforts to
increase civil society options are stymied by the vertical
systems of social connections, including the Soviet-style of
Government and party system. Thus, incorporation of the
Soviet meaning of power into national identity in Ukraine
impedes the development of the only force that can destroy
it – a mature civic society.
The escape from Soviet constructions of power is
possible by changing existing norms and beliefs in the
society. This norm change rests on a redeﬁnition of existing
themes and the introduction of new ones (Richards &
Swanger, 2009). These may include generative themes
whose syllabic elements could be recombined to form new
themes, thus generating a culture of democracy. These may
also include invader themes that completely alter the
Soviet meaning of power; hinge themes that connect the
existingmeaning of powerwith learning one ormore of the
elements of a culture of democracy; and losable themes
that provide a cultural change through everyday conver-
sations. Thus, the ﬁvemain features of the Soviet concept of
power – (political, social, and economic paternalism,
perception of power as source of proﬁt and violence, and
dual reality of power with the gap between ofﬁcial narra-
tive of power and a real life) should be challenged through
gradual redeﬁnitions and connections with the themes of
democracy and democratic participation in Government.
This change can be produced through communicating with
one another and acting ‘in concert’ (Arendt, 1970).
The model discussed here was developed to explain the
moderation of the current crisis of legitimacy in Ukraine,
but can be applied for other post-Soviet countries. While in
the case of Ukraine the group justiﬁcation rests on
a historic and cultural divide between regions, in Russia
group justiﬁcation processes resulted in wars in Chechnya
and Georgia. The legitimizing ideologies are more profound
and evident in Russia, because they incorporate Soviet
meaning of power developed by Stalin into the core of
national identity. Similar processes can be identiﬁed in
Central Asia. Another common feature that derives from
the model is the process of system justiﬁcation by people
and the embryonic state of civic society. “The degree of
liberty or tyranny in any government is.in large degree
a reﬂection of the relative determination of the subjects to
be free and their willingness and ability to resist efforts to
enslave them” (Sharp, 1973, p. 29). Thus, the process of
incorporation of the Soviet meaning of power into national
identities in post-Soviet states and enhancement of
authoritarianismwill continue until the people will be able
to organize themselves to become real agents of change.
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